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Legal commentators have been pushing for a stronger employer duty 
to accommodate religious beliefs and practices vis-à-vis Title VII for quite 
some time.1 In particular, they have been pushing for that duty to be on par 
with an employer’s duty to its disabled workers under Title I of the Ameri-
cans with Disability Act (“ADA”).2 However, elevating the duty required 
under Title VII will have serious consequences by creating a “moral haz-
ard” for employees to “pick and choose” a religion to avoid compliance 
with neutral employer rules. Among many other problems, this heightened 
duty will most importantly raise constitutional issues, notably the Estab-
lishment Clause.3
Commentators positing that Title VII standards should be in line with 
the ADA standards have put forth thorough and well-articulated arguments 
on the ideas preventing the Title VII standards from raising, such as neu-
trality, constitutional concerns, and the Court’s consistent opinion.4 How-
ever, the literature on this subject is one-sided and in dire need of a devil’s 
advocate arguing why Title VII standards for reasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship should not be elevated to the ADA’s, and further, why 
the current standards should not be elevated at all.
Part I of this article chronicles the background of Title VII and the 
ADA, along with introducing any other important considerations to the 
issue at hand. Part II addresses a recent Seventh Circuit ADA accommoda-
* Chicago-Kent College of Law, Class of 2014. A tremendous amount of thanks is owed to Professor 
Carolyn Shapiro, whose guidance and support helped ensure my voice came out in this note.
1. See, e.g., Keith S. Blair, Better Disabled Than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to Provide 
Adequate Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 531 
(2010).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-92 (excluding P.L. 113-76, 113-
79, and 113-89)) (effective Jan. 1, 2009).
3. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peacea-
bly to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(emphasis added). 
4. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 531.
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tion decision, which renders nearly all arguments that Title VII and ADA 
standards should move together whenever one of them is altered highly 
questionable, while also quickly noting how Title VII decisions are rigid in 
their application of rules. Part III, the core of this article, posits why Title 
VII should not be heightened to the ADA standards represented by the 
proposed Workplace Religious Freedom Act (“WRFA”),5 as well as how 
no religious accommodation should be able to trump an employer’s strictly 
enforced or provable neutral rule or law of general applicability. Finally, 
Part V proposes how aspects of the ADA’s accommodation process and 
“best practices” seen in certain Title VII cases can alleviate commentators’ 
concerns.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the issues pertaining to Title VII religious ac-
commodation claims and ADA accommodation claims, one needs a back-
ground on both statutes’ larger schemes and purposes, as well as what 
specific provisions within the statutes are important. Furthermore, it is im-
portant to understand the non-statutory concerns and issues raised about 
accommodations in regard to constitutional issues, choice issues, and so 
forth. Finally, summarizing the pertinent Supreme Court cases for both will 
help one understand the subject matter herein.
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 mainly to eradicate ra-
cial discrimination within the United States.6 The Act contained multiple 
titles to address discrimination in various settings.7 Title VII of the Act is 
aimed at discrimination within the workplace.8 Most importantly, Title VII 
holds that it is unlawful “for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”9 An “employer” under Title VII is essentially anything or anyone 
5. S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); see Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Ex-
pression in the Workplace, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
6. Blair, supra note 1, at 521.
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2012).
8. Id. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
9. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also applies to employment agencies and labor organizations in 
similar ways, but that is beyond the scope of this note. Id. § 2000e-2(b)-(c).
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engaged in commerce with at least fifteen employees.10 Of note, Title VII 
includes a provision that affords employers a defense for intentionally dis-
criminating based on religion, national origin, or sex, if there is a bona fide 
reason, such as a nondiscriminatory seniority system.11
Racial discrimination was the impetus for passing the Act and thus lit-
tle, if any, legislative history was available and reliable on what originally 
constituted religious discrimination.12 Instead, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (“EEOC”) was initially the agency charged with 
providing guidelines to employers and the courts on religious accommoda-
tions.13 The general view with regard to religion and the workplace has 
been that Title VII seeks to prevent an employee from choosing between 
his religion and his job if he does not have to.14
Where an employer has taken an adverse employment action solely 
based on an applicant or employee’s religion on its face, Title VII religious 
discrimination claims typically have not been “status-based”.15 Instead, 
most religious discrimination claims arise out of a conflict between an em-
ployee’s religious belief or practice and an employer’s workplace expecta-
tions.16 In other words, employers were sued for not “accommodating” an 
employee’s religion. However, Title VII did not initially place the burden 
of accommodating on employers. This was made clear in Dewey v. Reyn-
olds Metals Co. where the court held that:
Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any Congres-
sional intent to coerce or compel one person . . . to accommodate the re-
ligious beliefs of another. The requirement of [religious] 
10. Id. § 2000e(b). Additionally, one should note that the definition of an employee under 
§ 2000e(f) has been an area of dispute with regard to meeting the employer requirement. Walters v. 
Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997). Also, please note that this note will not touch upon 
non-secular employers (i.e. “churches”) as they are subject to certain exemptions that are beyond the 
scope and focus of this note. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
11. Id. § 2000e-2(h). Additionally, religious institutions are accorded an exemption from religious 
discrimination claims as to all its requisite human resources decisions. Id. § 2000e-1(a). Furthermore, 
religious institutions have a “ministerial exception” which exempts any and all discrimination claims 
related to its ministers. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 706-07 (2012).
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1964).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. The guidelines were last substantively updated in 1980 and can be 
found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1605.1-.3 (2012).
14. See, e.g., Alan D. Schuchman, Note, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the 
Different Applications of the Reasonable-Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND.
L.J. 745, 757 (1998).
15. Blair, supra note 1, at 546.
16. Id.
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accommodation . . . is contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in 
our judgment are not consistent with the Act.17
In response to Dewey, Senator Jennings Randolph successfully pushed 
forth an amendment to Title VII in 1972, which burdens employers with 
accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs or practices.18 As a result, 
Congress amended the definition of “religion” under Title VII to make an 
employer also liable for religious discrimination from failure to accommo-
date “unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-
commodate an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance 
or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s busi-
ness.”19
In order for an employee to bring a Title VII religious discrimination 
claim based on a failure to accommodate, he must establish a prima facie 
case of religious discrimination by showing:
(1) [H]e had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted 
with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of the belief and 
conflict; and (3) the employer threatened him with or subjected him to 
discriminatory treatment, including discharge, because of his inability to 
fulfill the job requirements.20
With regard to the bona fide religious belief, the courts have made a 
compromise in handling Title VII religious accommodation cases by not 
inquiring into the validity of a plaintiff’s alleged religious bona fide belief
or practice in any significant way, and instead focusing on the reasonable-
ness of the accommodation.21 If the plaintiff is successful, the burden then 
shifts to the employer to prove he “initiated good faith efforts to reasonably 
accommodate the employee’s religious practices.”22 If the employer’s ef-
17. 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), 
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006), as recognized in Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 
F.2d 1081, 1087 (6th Cir. 1987). 
18. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012)).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
20. E.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993).
21. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (ruling whether 
plaintiff’s membership to the Church of Body Modification was a bona fide religious practice protected 
by Title VII was not necessary since defendant established reasonable accommodations would have 
imposed undue hardship); Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious 
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 361-62 (1997). Cloutier’s church 
is all online and formed in 1999, has roughly 1000 members, and its mission statement is “to grow as 
individuals through body modification and its teachings, to promote growth in mind, body and spirit, 
and to be confident role models in learning, teaching, and displaying body modification.” Cloutier, 390 
F.3d. at 129; see Mission Statement, CHURCH OF BODY MODIFICATION, http://uscobm.com/mission-
statement/ (last visited May 2, 2014).
22. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004); see Sarah Abigail Wol-
kinson, Comment, A Critical Historical and Legal Reappraisal of Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.: 
Judicial Emasculation of the Duty of Accommodation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1185, 1190-91 (2010).
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forts do not result in an accommodation that the employee feels eliminates 
the conflict, then the employer must prove that reasonably accommodating 
the employee would cause an undue hardship.23 If the employer successful-
ly proves undue hardship, then he is excused from liability.24
Since the 1972 amendment, Congress has not enacted legislation fur-
ther elaborating upon what constitutes a “reasonable accommodation” and 
“undue hardship,” despite numerous other amendments made to Title VII.25
Instead, the Court and EEOC have had to determine what each means. De-
spite no clear definition from the Court on what a “reasonable accommoda-
tion” is, the Court has held that once an employer proves he “has offered a 
reasonable accommodation to the employee” which resolves the religious 
conflict, then he has fulfilled his duty.26 Furthermore, despite EEOC objec-
tions,27 an employer does not need to offer multiple reasonable accommo-
dations or accept a proposed accommodation from the employee if the 
employer has already offered a reasonable accommodation.28 Finally, in 
relation to defining reasonable accommodation, there is some disagreement 
between courts on whether the accommodation must “eliminate” or “re-
solve” the religious conflict.29
Unlike reasonable accommodation, the Court has defined “undue 
hardship” as being when an employer would “bear more than a de minimis 
cost” in order to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religion.30 How-
ever, this definition left very little guidance to the lower courts. The various 
federal circuit courts have articulated a variety of different standards.31
However, the biggest disagreement among the circuit courts is whether any 
standard can be proven with a factual hypothetical posed by an employer or 
whether actual factual evidence is required.32
23. Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1190.
24. Id.
25. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amend-
ed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(codified as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-5, 2000e-16 (2012)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 7 (codified as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-16 
(2012)).
26. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
27. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c) (2012).
28. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69.
29. See id. at 69-70.
30. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
31. Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1191-92.
32. Id.
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According to many commentators, failure to accommodate claims
arise in three different ways that represent the general scope of the issue:33
employer scheduling, whether it is for a certain day of the week,34 certain 
days during the year,35 or daily prayer conflicts;36 employer grooming re-
quirements, whether for safety37, employer’s public image38, or uniformi-
ty;39 and religious attire conflicts similar to the grooming ones.40
Alternatively, courts analyzed the scope of the issue based on whether the 
timing of the employer’s implementation of the conflicting facially neutral
policy was before41 or after42 the plaintiff-employee started working for the 
employer.43
33. Not included, or particularly relevant in the three types, is a special case that only arises when 
an employer becomes unionized and an employee alleges their faith opposes paying union dues. Yott v. 
N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979). Initially, the most complicated of the types due 
to Establishment Clause and contract rights issues, courts have generally come to agree the only ac-
commodation available is if the employee pays the same amount of dues to a charity that is chosen by 
the employee, the union, or both. See id. at 906; Burns v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 
1978); see also Reed v. Intl. Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., 569 
F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding payment of dues to one of three charitable organizations was a rea-
sonable accommodation of religious objector’s faith).
34. Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
36. See Elmenayer v. ABF Freight System, Inc., 318 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2003); Knight v. Conn. 
Dept. of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Berry v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642 
(9th Cir. 2006).
37. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding Sikh em-
ployee’s beard would compromise OSHA safety standards if allowed to maintain role as machinist 
surrounded by toxic gases).
38. EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding employer’s
conditioning Sikh applicant’s employment on shaving his beard was valid as clean shaven appearance 
was a bona fide qualification of a manager in family restaurant). 
39. See, e.g., Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1993).
40. See Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII 
and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 746 (1996). 
41. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (analyzing a seniority system 
in a collective bargaining agreement).
42. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2006) (grooming 
policy).
43. See Piraino v. Intl. Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1996). In some 
disparate treatment claims, plaintiffs can present circumstantial evidence of an employer’s “suspicious 
timing” of implementing a new employment policy, which if proven, the defendant-employer must 
rebut. This “suspicious timing” evidence is the basis for a potential new burden upon employers in 
accommodation cases where the conflicting policy is implemented after the plaintiff-employee had been 
working for the employer for some time. As to when the policy is implemented before, a unique consid-
eration of whether the unclean hands defense, which in employment contexts includes lying or with-
holding important information on a resume or in an interview, should be allowed narrowly only for an 
employer in a failure to accommodate suit. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 
360-61 (1995). With regards to this note, I do not address blatant purposeful lies, but only an applicant 
who withholds important information. An employer would be ill advised to ask or require someone to 
divulge certain personal information, such as religious belief during an interview or in a job posting. 
See Best Practice for Eradicating Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/best_practices_religion.html (last modified July 23, 2008). However, 
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B. The ADA
Congress passed the ADA in 1990 largely in order to counteract disa-
bility discrimination in private-sector employment by expounding upon the 
foundations of the prior Rehabilitation Act.44 In the ADA’s findings sec-
tion, Congress made clear that until 1990, disabled individuals had no legal 
recourse for discrimination based on their disability, unlike religious dis-
crimination, and as a result of disability discrimination, the United States 
had spent “billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from de-
pendency and non-productivity.”45 The ADA covers discrimination in vari-
ous settings, but Title I of the ADA is relevant to disability discrimination 
in the workplace.46 As such, it is unlawful for any covered entity47 to “dis-
criminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard 
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment.”48
Of the different types of ADA discrimination claims, an employee 
seeking a “failure to accommodate a disability” claim must establish:
(1) [He] is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) 
an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with 
asking whether one can work on certain days and at certain times is perfectly legal as long as the ques-
tions are pertinent to the job. Therefore, if an employee lies or errs in response to one of these questions 
and is subsequently hired and then informs the employer of the lie or error, an employer is placed in a 
difficult position that may not be easily remedied. See Crider v. Univ. of Tenn., Knoxville, No. 11–
5511, 2012 WL 3002756, at *8-10 (6th Cir. July 23, 2012) (McKeague, Cir. J., dissenting). The inquiry 
is again beyond the scope of this article, but under a failure to accommodate situation, if during dis-
charge the employer lacks the discriminatory animus that has been seen in other cases, it may follow 
that upon hiring the misleading employee, he bears all the burden and risk. In this scenario, the employ-
ee has everything to gain with the only risk being terminated from a position she knew she could not 
fulfill at the outset. See id.
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2009); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, 
Something Blue: Why Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 603 n.1 (2001); 
Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2010).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a); see Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 
1995) (finding ADA is meant to benefit the economy by ensuring accommodation costs employer’s
bear are outweighed by productivity gains from disabled employees).
46. §§ 12111-12117.
47. § 12111(2). The definition for employer is in the same section as well. Id.
48. § 12112(a). For the purposes of this article, an employee-plaintiff is assumed to have a “disa-
bility,” § 12102(1), § 12102(2) (“Major Life Activities”), § 12102(3) (regarded as having such an 
impairment), § 12102(4) (Rules of construction regarding the definition of disability), and be a “quali-
fied individual,” § 12111(8), under the ADA in order to fairly compare Title VII to the ADA. Examples 
of disabilities that are covered include diseases such as diabetes, Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. 
& Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009), and physical limitations resulting from injury on the job or 
from birth, among others. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 391 (2002) (back pain); 
EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 762 (7th Cir. 2012) (injured arm). Finally, it should be 
noted the EEOC provides administrative guidelines on compliance with the ADA, as well as enforcing 
the ADA. § 12117(a); § 12116.
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reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential func-
tions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such 
accommodations.49
Notice to an employer results in the employer learning the employee 
has a disability and wants an accommodation.50 The notice does not need to 
be explicit and does not even need to come from the employee himself. 
Determining when and how the employer has the minimal requisite notice 
typically is an easy inquiry of what information was available to the em-
ployer, whether it be the employee’s statements, various records such as 
job performance evaluation, or simply a third party bringing a concern 
about the employee to the manager’s attention.51
Reasonable accommodation is not statutorily defined; instead, the 
statute simply gives a few examples of accommodations:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessi-
ble . . . and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equip-
ment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examina-
tions, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or 
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disa-
bilities.52
Once notice is given, the “interactive process” required by the ADA 
becomes crucial in determining a reasonable accommodation.53 If notice 
has been established, and if any of the parties refuses to engage in good 
faith bargaining over the accommodation, the opposite party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.54 An employee is not entitled to their pre-
ferred accommodation, only one that is reasonable and allows him to work 
comfortably and on par with other non-disabled workers.55 While the em-
ployee lacks the right to choose his accommodation, he does have the right 
49. McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009); see
§ 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B); Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838-39 (7th Cir. 2012).
50. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (“stating that [w]hat 
matters under the ADA are not formalisms about the manner of the request, but whether the employee 
or a representative for the employee provides the employer with enough information that, under the 
circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of both the disability and desire for an accom-
modation.”).
51. John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, What Is Reasonable Accommodation Under 
the ADA? Not an Easy Answer; Rather A Plethora of Questions, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 67, 77-78 (2009).
52. § 12111(9).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2012).
54. See Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding employer was entitled to 
summary judgment since employee failed to provide employer with requested details about disability); 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 806 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “an employer cannot 
sit behind a closed door and reject the employee’s requests for accommodation without explaining why 
the requests have been rejected or offering alternatives.”).
55. Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
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to an explanation as to why his proposed accommodation is not reasona-
ble.56 Finally, the EEOC has created regulations that the employer must 
consider with regard to the accommodation, which ensures the fulfillment 
of the “essential job function.”57
Outside of facially valid, bad-faith assertions, whether an employer 
failed to accommodate depends upon whether the reasonable accommoda-
tion required would impose an undue hardship upon an employer.58 Undue 
hardship is defined as “requiring significant difficulty or expense” on the 
employer based on factors laid out in the statute, such as the accommoda-
tion’s cost, size of the employer, and industry the employer is in.59
Unlike Title VII, the ADA does not contain an explicit provision ex-
empting liability on the basis of a seniority provision or similar neutral 
workplace rules of general applicability akin to a collective-bargaining 
agreement.60 With regard to hiring practices, employers can only request 
information about or test certain physical and mental capacities if the in-
quiry is requested of all applicants and is essential to the job-related func-
tions.61
C. Other Considerations for Religious Discrimination
While discrimination based on religion is similar to race, color, na-
tional origin, sex and disability, religion involves unique considerations and 
differs from the others in a few ways. All of the considerations essentially 
involve a balancing of the employee and employer interests.62 Though sta-
tus claims can arise with all of bases for discrimination, religion is the least 
likely to be provable since most religious discrimination claims involve 
minority faiths with small numbers which, sans direct evidence, are hard to 
prove by implication.63 The right to reasonable accommodation is only 
afforded to religion and disability.64
56. See Sears, 417 F.3d at 807.
57. Hoppe, 692 F.3d at 838 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2012)).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2009).
59. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2011).
60. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 420 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“[n]othing in the ADA insulates seniority rules from the ‘reasonable accommodation’ requirement, in 
marked contrast to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, each of which has an explicit protection for seniority.”).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2009) (relating to medical examinations and inquiries); see 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.15(b)-(c) (“requirement is job-related and consistent with business necessity”).
62. See Engle, supra note 21, at 361; § 12111(9)-(10).
63. See Jamar, supra note 40, at 720-21.
64. Blair, supra note 1, at 531.
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The extent of the accommodation and standards applied to disability is 
more burdensome on employers than religion under Title VII. Why the 
ADA is more burdensome than Title VII has been the subject of many aca-
demic articles that revolve around the topics of choice,65 neutrality,66 con-
stitutional issues,67 meaning of accommodation in both contexts,68 and
religion in general.69
The Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to state employers, are acknowledged 
as potential barriers to further burdening employers under Title VII akin to 
the ADA. Many commentators argue the current Title VII accommodations 
already are preferential, Free Exercise is important enough to negate any 
Establishment clause issues, or both.70
Commentators on Heightened Title VII standards admit one’s religion 
is a choice, unlike disability.71 However, once someone makes their choice, 
scholars feel it is a permanent part of how people identify themselves and, 
as such, is a moot difference between disability and religious accommoda-
tions analysis.72
D. Relevant Supreme Court Holdings on Reasonable Accommodation
In light of the academically written articles, an understanding of the 
three seminal Supreme Court cases on reasonable accommodation for both 
the ADA and Title VII is necessary.
In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, Plaintiff Hardison worked in an 
around-the-clock Trans World Airlines (“TWA”) maintenance department 
and was a follower of a faith that observed the Sabbath by not working 
from sunset on Friday until sunset on Saturday.73 When Hardison decided 
to transfer buildings within the facility, he became a junior employee sub-
ject to a seniority list. This designation meant he would be forced to violate 
the Sabbath when other employees went on vacation.74 Despite the union, 
65. Id. at 546-48.
66. See Engle, supra note 21, at 358-59.
67. See Robert A. Sedler, Essay: The Protection of Religious Freedom Under the American 
Constitution, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 817, 817-20 (2007).
68. See Malloy, supra note 44, at 624-25.
69. See Blair, supra note 1, at 515.
70. Id. at 548-55; Schuchman, supra note 14, at 757-59.
71. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 546-47.
72. See, e.g., id. at 547 (“That choice may be a conscious choice made because of attending 
worship services or some life-changing experience. The decision can be a choice that is made over time, 
as when a person is born into a particular religion. In any event, a choice is ultimately made.”)
73. 432 U.S. 63, 67 (1977).
74. Id. at 68.
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TWA, and Hardison’s best efforts, no deal was reached, and Hardison was 
subsequently terminated for insubordination and filed his claim.75
Hardison’s failure to accommodate claim reached the Supreme Court 
in 1977. The Court held for the employer and union since Title VII was 
meant to eliminate discrimination in employment. Additionally, in light of 
the 1972 amendment that defined religion under Title VII, “[i]t would be 
anomalous to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress 
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some 
employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to 
accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others.”76 Regarding the 1972 
amendment by Senator Randolph and its legislative history, the Court 
found nothing in it that would “require an employer to discriminate against 
some employees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath.”77 The 
Court found anything more than a de minimis cost would constitute an un-
due hardship.78
In Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, a unionized teacher with 
the same faith as Hardison, brought a claim against his school for not ac-
cepting either of his proposals for accommodating his religion.79 The Court 
ruled for the school because it had offered a reasonable accommodation of 
allowing unpaid leave for days the teacher needed to take off for religious 
reasons.80 In reviewing its interpretation of § 701(j)81 in Hardison, the 
Court renewed its holding that the 1972 amendment and legislative history 
“is of little help in defining the employer’s accommodation obligation.”82
75. For all intents and purposes, the union, TWA, and Hardison, came to an impasse. The union 
would not allow the violation of seniority provisions for a forced job swap of an unwilling employee 
without allowing other employees to bid on the swap to get overtime pay, and TWA was not willing to 
accept a four day a week proposal since the department Hardison worked in always required being fully 
staffed. Id. at 68-69.
76. Id. at 81.
77. Id. at 85.
78. Id. at 84. Since the decision in 1977, Congress has yet to successfully amend Title VII to 
overcome the pivotal ruling that a religious reasonable accommodation can never trump a strictly 
enforced neutral law or rule of general applicability such as a seniority system within a collective-
bargaining agreement. See id. at 79-81. The Court discusses how the inclusion of the seniority provision 
in Title VII was indicative of how no accommodation could involve being exempt. Id.
79. The school denied both proposals because either one would represent an exception to a strict-
ly enforced neutral policy of allowing employees to utilize paid contractual days off for certain reasons 
and not allowing teachers to pay substitute teachers directly on other certain days off. 479 U.S. 60, 63-
65 (1986); see United States v. Bd. of Educ. for Sch. Dist. of Phila., 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing school accommodating Muslim teacher by allowing her to wear her religious garb would impose 
undue hardship by violating a state law prohibiting public school teachers from wearing anything 
denoting that the teacher is part of a religious sect). 
80. 479 U.S. at 70-71.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2012).
82. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986).
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Thus the Court held an employee is not entitled to the accommodation of 
their choice and “an employer has met its obligation under § 701(j) when it 
demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the em-
ployee.”83
In 2002, the Supreme Court faced an ADA failure to accommodate 
claim in U.S. Airways v. Barnett, where an employee was reassigned to the 
mailroom post-injury, but later, despite requesting an accommodation to be 
allowed to maintain in the mailroom, he lost the position when it became 
subject to a seniority provision.84 The situation was akin to Hardison and 
Philbrook wherein the accommodation requested was for the employer to 
make a personal exception to a neutral rule or law of general applicability, 
except here there was no collective bargaining agreement.85
The Court had to interpret the purposes of the ADA and determine to 
what extent employers were supposed to accommodate.86 In response to the 
employer arguing that strictly enforced neutral workplace rules of general 
applicability can never be trumped, the Court held that an ADA accommo-
dation in certain instances, if proven by a plaintiff, would trump the strictly
enforced neutral rule and not impose undue hardship.87 The Court ruled the 
collective-bargaining aspect of Hardison and Philbrook were not distin-
guishing factors in its ruling. Instead, it held unilaterally, uniformly applied 
and imposed rules and policies require the same analysis as if there were a 
collective bargaining agreement.88 Though the Court ultimately held for the 
employer since the seniority system was strictly enforced,89 it ruled that 
unlike Title VII, ADA plaintiffs’ accommodations may be preferential. 
This was because the ADA’s purpose and findings are more explicit than 
Title VII in regards to accommodations, and the ADA lacks similar Title 
VII seniority-system limitations which Congress was likely to be privy to 
because the ADA was written based on Title VII language.90
II. WHERE THE STANDARDS ARE TODAY
Both ADA and Title VII reasonable accommodation and undue hard-
ship standards have changed since their respective enactments. Whereas 
83. Id.
84. For five months, U.S. Airways allowed him to keep his role while investigating the matter, 
but decided not to allow an exception. 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002).
85. Id. at 403.
86. Id. at 394-403.
87. Id. at 397-98.
88. Id. at 403.
89. Id. at 405.
90. See id. at 397-403.
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Title VII’s has become more pragmatic in attempting to apply rigid rules of 
the past,91 the ADA burden continues to rise with no indication of leveling 
off in light of a recent Seventh Circuit opinion representing a trend of cer-
tain ADA accommodations becoming potentially mandated.92 As a result, 
any argument for the ADA and Title VII standards to move step-in-step 
with each other is highly questionable due to significant Establishment 
Clause concerns for Title VII.93
In EEOC v. United Airlines, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had 
to determine whether the ADA could mandate “employers to appoint em-
ployees who are losing their current positions due to disability to a vacant 
position for which they are qualified.”94 Circuit Court Judge Richard D.
Cudahy recognized Barnett’s ultimate holding, but found that the Court 
specifically pointed out that a “plaintiff . . . nonetheless remains free to 
show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, despite the presence 
of a seniority system . . . the requested ‘accommodation’ is ‘reasonable’ on 
the particular facts.”95 As a result, Judge Cudahy found that Barnett created 
a two-step process in evaluating whether an accommodation would not 
impose undue hardship by violating an otherwise strictly enforced neutral 
rule or law of general applicability.96 Judge Cudahy remanded the case to 
determine whether a mandated reassignment passes the Barnett two-step 
analysis.97 Furthermore, his dicta notably rejected the purported United 
Airlines preferential transfer policy as being a reasonable accommodation 
on its face and that ultimately “[w]hile employers may prefer to hire the 
best qualified applicant, the violation of a best-qualified selection policy 
91. Compare Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006), with EEOC v. 
Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). In Brown, the court emphasizes how prior 
black line rulings from circuit courts may have been more on decisional grounds and thus courts should 
read rulings narrowly. 419 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
92. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that in light of the 
Barnett case, “the ADA does indeed mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to 
vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily 
reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer”).
93. See id. at 761; James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering 
Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 525, 537 (2004).
94. 693 F.3d at 761.
95. Id. at 763 (citing U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002)).
96. Step one is to determine if the accommodation, which is violative of a strictly enforced neu-
tral rule, would be reasonable “in the run of cases.” If so, then step two determines “if there are fact-
specific considerations particular to [defendant-employer’s situation] that would render [the accommo-
dation] unreasonable.” Id.
97. Id. at 764-65; see id. at 763 n.1; cf. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 
2007).
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does not involve the property-rights and administrative concerns (and re-
sulting burdens) presented by the violation of a seniority policy.”98
The most crucial takeaway from this case is that a disabled employ-
ee’s accommodation could trump a strictly enforced neutral rule of general 
applicability if he can prove in the run of cases it is not unreasonable (e.g., 
not “requiring significant difficulty or expense”) and even if it is, he still 
can prove his specific circumstances would not.99 If a religious employee 
were ever accorded such preference under Title VII, § 701(j)’s constitu-
tionality would be highly questionable since the government would become 
significantly entangled in almost every private business in America. Addi-
tionally, any strictly enforced policy could be subject to judicial scrutiny in 
which an employee may be exempted solely based on his religion.100 How-
ever, no commentator is seeking such heightened standards for Title VII.101
Title VII religious accommodations cases continue a trend of moving 
away from drawing stark lines and rules to becoming more pragmatic in its 
case review, but the courts have struggled in rigidly applying precedential 
rules. Representative of this difficulty are United States v. New York Trans-
it Authority102 and Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co.,103 two cases out of the 
First Circuit involving employees whose personal appearance did not con-
form to their employer’s generally applied neutral rule. Both cases call into 
question the broad-based rule from the circuit precedent of Cloutier v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., which held an employee seeking “an outright 
98. United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764. The preferential transfer policy (the accommodation) that 
gave preference (i.e. guaranteed interview and priority over another “equally qualified” candidate) to 
recently disabled employees in seeking reassignment through an admittedly “competitive process.” See
id. at 761-62.
99. See, e.g., id. at 762-65; Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (hearing 
en banc); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hearing en banc).
100. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860-64 (2005). Justice Souter’s opinion in 
this case deals with the presence of the Ten Commandments on state property in various forms, but 
what is significant from this opinion is the concern of what would happen if larger religions received 
preferential treatment within the workplace. This note acknowledges no commentator aspiring for such 
treatment to any religion, but implied in seeking more protection for religious practices within the 
workplace there is always a risk, though admittedly weak, that it could lead to a slippery slope. Addi-
tionally, whereas disabled employees’ accommodations will cost money, most accommodations for 
religion do not, and so the issue of what constitutes a “significant difficulty” (undue hardship standard 
for the ADA) under Title VII may be issuesome.
101. Ms. Wolkinson’s article could be read as requiring something akin to such a standard; howev-
er, her point in rebuking the Bhatia safety decision is simply to propose a business necessity standard 
for employers to prove undue hardship would come of an accommodation. Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 
1206-08.
102. No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL 3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
103. 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006).
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exemption from a neutral dress code ‘would be an undue hardship because 
it would adversely affect the employer’s public image.’”104
In New York Transit Authority, the issue was whether exempting Sikh 
and Muslim transit employees from the transit authority dress code, specif-
ically as to wearing their turbans and khirmars in place of transit authority 
official headwear, would place undue hardship upon the transit authority.105
Despite years of negotiations resulting in an agreement that the plaintiff-
employees could wear their turbans and khirmars as long as they matched 
the transit authority uniform colors, the plaintiffs still refused to place the 
transit authority logo on their headwear.106 The transit authority filed for 
summary judgment relying on Cloutier’s holding that seemingly barred 
ultimatums.107 The court found Cloutier wholly inapplicable since the em-
ployees were not seeking a complete exemption from the policy as they had 
agreed to wear headwear that matched the uniforms.108 Furthermore, the 
court held Cloutier was only applicable where the employee made no effort 
to compromise or where the only accommodation possible was a complete 
exemption, but in the latter situation the employer-defendant still needed to 
prove the exemption would place undue hardship upon it.109 In the end, the 
court ruled the case may continue and the transit authority’s motion for 
summary judgment was denied.110
In Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., the court ruled on whether an oil-
change employee, who never shaved or cut his hair based on his Rastafari-
an religion, was reasonably accommodated when his employer moved him 
to the lower bay, denying him the customer interaction he had before the 
employer implemented its new grooming policy.111 The Rastafarian em-
ployee sought an exemption from the new policy so that he could have his 
desired client interaction and not be relegated to the cold and isolated lower 
bay. The court, bound by Cloutier, ruled for the defendant that the reas-
signment to the lower bay was a reasonable accommodation.112
104. Id. at 15 (citing Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004)); see 
Part II infra for more detail on this case.
105. 2010 WL 3855191, at *1.
106. Id. at *8. This case is likely representative of the employer policy existing before the employ-
ees were hired, but focusing on this aspect is unimportant since the original policy employees were 
subject to has been modified through negotiations between the transit authority and the religious em-
ployees.
107. See id. at *19.
108. See id. at *20-21.
109. See id.
110. Id. at *23.
111. See 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9-11 (D. Mass. 2006). This is a textbook case of how an employer’s
policy was implemented after the employee had already been working there.
112. See id. at 15-20.
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In ultimately holding as it did, the court went to great lengths to make 
clear Cloutier should be very narrowly construed and that Cloutier stand-
ards for proving undue hardship in personal-appearance cases was too stark 
and in need of flexibility.113 The opinion makes clear that affording a pri-
vate employer the virtual affirmative defense of “public image” without 
any evidence weighs too heavily on the employee’s religion.114 Therefore, 
it found Cloutier should be read as an employee’s take-it-or-leave-it ac-
commodation demand from an appearance policy places undue hardship 
because of the precedent set by the demand, but the case should not be read 
as granting a company’s “insistence on virtually complete autonomy in 
shaping its public image.”115
The rest of the opinion voices its concerns with how “employer’s 
preferences, or . . . prejudices,” in maintaining a certain “public image” are 
given significant weight as long as his policy is facially neutral.116 Com-
mentators in favor of raising the Title VII burdens on employers have 
brought up this relevant issue with regard to situations like Brown.117 The 
employer’s grooming policy in Brown does not qualify as a strictly en-
forced neutral policy because it was adopted after the plaintiff had worked 
there for some time. Therefore, when an employer institutes a new neutral 
policy of general applicability that conflicts with current employees’ reli-
gious beliefs or practices, the employer should have a more significant 
burden to prove118 undue hardship than in cases where the employer policy 
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 17.
116. See id. at 15-20. The best quote to sum up the district court’s uneasiness of the First Circuit 
standards is:
The proper balancing of bona fide religious practices against an employer’s policy decisions 
remains a difficult issue, as the struggles exhibited by these cases demonstrate. Still, it is a 
matter of concern when the balance appears to tip too strongly in favor of an employer’s pref-
erences, or perhaps prejudices. An excessive protection of an employer’s “image” predilec-
tion encourages an unfortunately (and unrealistically) homogeneous view of our richly varied 
nation. Worse, it places persons whose work habits and commitment to their employers may 
be exemplary in the position of having to choose between a job and a deeply held religious 
practice. It is unclear whether the decision being made in this memorandum strikes the bal-
ance properly, but there is no question that it is compelled by controlling authority.
Id. at 18-19.
117. See Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1205-06. 
118. What “prove” should mean in terms of an evidentiary burden or burden of proof involves 
topics beyond the scope of this article, but I will say an employer can “prove” undue hardship by show-
ing the new neutral policy of general applicability was adopted based on something akin to a consult-
ant’s analysis and recommendation like in Brown as opposed to asserting a mere “public image”
defense without further elaboration.
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pre-dated the plaintiff’s employment.119 The First Circuit’s judicial stand-
ards are more pro-employer than other circuits that require more.120 While 
this case may seem counter to a “neutral rule” thesis, Title VII cases are 
extremely fact intensive. If this case were tried in a different circuit, the 
plaintiff might win since the facts do not indicate a rise in business after the 
employee was relegated to the lower bay.121
III. WHY TITLE VII RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS SHOULD NOT TRUMP A 
STRICTLY ENFORCED OR PROVABLE NEUTRAL RULE OR LAW OF GENERAL 
APPLICABILITY
This part of the article serves as a “devil’s advocate” to a WRFA pro-
posal and commentators, suggesting the Title VII and ADA standards for 
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” should be the same at 
the ADA levels. Both statutes involve highly fact-intensive inquiries,122
where subjective context and the circuit the case is tried in may vary the 
amount of protection afforded. However, from a comprehensive point of 
view, a religious accommodation cannot trump a strictly enforced or prov-
able neutral rule or law of general applicability without imposing undue 
hardship, while a disability accommodation can.123 Therefore, Title VII 
119. The burden upon the employer based on whether the conflicting policy implementation 
happened before or after plaintiff’s employment is based on the employee’s “choice” to become a tenet 
of a certain faith covered in supra Part III(C).
120. See Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1191-92. Wolkinson points out, for example, the different 
standards for de minimis costs in the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth.
121. See Brown, 319 F. Supp. 2d. at 9-11. In Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the attorney 
pointed out how the “no beard policy” had any real effect on business, and even if it did, the employer 
could not point to anything concrete. Specifically, the brief said:
F.L. Roberts claims now that the personal appearance policy change was a change which in-
creased revenues. However, when pressed to provide facts to support this claim, the defendant 
admits that it does not know whether the “no beard” policy had any bearing on sales from the 
2002-2002 year, or whether it was other changes, like a new sales model, which led to any in-
crease. Mr. Smith has admitted that, as a point of fact, he cannot prove that the “no beard”
rule had any impact at all. As to customer feedback on the appearance of employees, Mr. 
Smith can only state that “more than one” person over an eighteen month period commented 
on the personal appearance of Jiffy Lube personnel.
Brief for Petitioner, Brown v. F.L. Roberts, 2005 WL 6259501 (D.Mass. 2006) (No. 04-30105-MAP). 
Part V of this article deals with the disconnect between circuits to propose an ideal set of burdens on the 
parties in order to ensure employees do not have to choose between their faith and job, while still 
maintaining a neutral governmental position and respect for employers’ and coworkers’ rights.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)-(10) (2012); Berry v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (Title VII).
123. See U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 398 (2002); Engle, supra note 21, at 360 (holding 
that “[d]espite all the shifts that have occurred over the years in Title VII religious accommodation 
doctrine, which are discussed in this Part, courts have had a difficult time requiring employers to make 
exceptions to their ‘neutral’ rules.”). As discussed in Section II, the Seventh Circuit recently held a 
disabled employee might be entitled to an accommodation that trumps an employer‘s otherwise strictly 
enforced neutral rule of general applicability. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 
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accommodations should always be held unreasonable and thus impose an 
undue hardship whenever it would trump a strictly enforced124 or provable 
neutral rule or law of general applicability.125
The reasons for why the two statutes should not afford the same 
amount of protection to employees or, put another way, to burden the em-
ployers and coworkers, range from the economic to the judicial-legislative 
interactions that imply constitutional concerns with the Establishment 
Clause. Most of these reasons are addressed by heightened Title VII stand-
ards’ commentators. However, these commentators either did not address 
or glossed over one common theme throughout most of the reasons why the 
line of “neutrality” must never be crossed:126 the potential for “moral haz-
ards,” as defined as incentivizing people to become “religious” solely for 
the preferential treatment and safeguards afforded by the government, re-
sulting from the heightened standards interplay with how Title VII accom-
modation cases are judicially handled.127
2012); see supra Part II. This potential “mandate” to employers in certain instances as applied in Title 
VII religious accommodations is analogous to a Connecticut statute that was held unconstitutional in
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The important part of the statute was: “No person 
who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer 
to work on such day. An employee’s refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his 
dismissal.” Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 706. Under Title VII, such a mandate would fail under the 
Lemon v. Kurtzmann test, which courts use for Establishment Clause violation inquiries like in Caldor.
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute 
must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Id. Regardless of the first part of 
the test, the highly preferential mandate language would primarily promote religion in its effects due to 
the strong governmental entanglement with private and state employers’ ability to operate and their
right to craft neutral workplace policies to avoid conflicts between fellow workers and the company or 
state itself. See Caldor, 472 U.S. at 712 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Therefore, if Title VII standards 
adopted the mandate option the ADA potentially could gain, then there is a substantial chance the 
altered § 701(j) provision could not withstand an Establishment Clause challenge. See Oleske, supra
note 93, at 537. Since the ADA standards only recently changed, utilizing the newfound ADA standard 
as the one commentators seek Title VII to be like is unfair and thus this article will be comparing Title 
VII’s standard to the preferential, yet non-mandatory ADA standards on par with what was adopted in 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), or the 
thirteen-time-proposed WRFA. S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010). 
124. As a reminder, strictly enforced means the policy is enforced so consistently as to create an 
implied contractual right to every employee of consistent performance, which if breached would require 
a remedy to the harmed employee.
125. As a side note, plaintiffs are always able to prove the employer’s supposed “neutral policy” is 
either not neutral or not applied consistently. Those types of claims would likely fall under a disparate 
treatment (intentional discrimination) cause of action. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973).
126. By “never crossed,” I mean that the spirit of a truly bona fide neutral policy must never be 
cast aside in favor of a religious accommodation without more (i.e., mitigation or inconsistent applica-
tion by employer).
127. Judges refrain from deep inquiry into whether someone’s religious belief is bona fide. See
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129 (1st Cir. 2004); Engle, supra note 21, at 362.
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A. Economic Rationale for the ADA Heightened Standards is not Present 
for Title VII
Looking to the legislative history of a statute for its purpose is usually 
an exercise in “looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends,”128
but when a statute states its purpose in explicit terms, then the legislature 
really was trying to drive the point home.129 Therefore, when Congress 
passed the ADA in 1990, they were signaling to the courts, employers, 
employees, and the EEOC, that this law was about more than just anti-
discrimination but also about helping the economy. Congress stated:
[T]he continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and 
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on 
an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free socie-
ty is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in 
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.130
In contrast, there is no legislative history or related purpose section 
within Title VII or any of its amendments advocating any sort of economic 
benefit derived from strong religious accommodations on par with the 
ADA. The overall purposes served by Title VII and the ADA are incredibly 
different.
Some commentators look at how both the ADA and Title VII are alike 
in creating economic benefits, but their support is based mostly on the 
normative observation that the employer’s intolerance of religion will cause 
him to make “economically unsound” judgments just as he does for the 
disabled.131 However, these commentators overlook two things in making 
this argument. The ADA was an express act by Congress to root out the 
subconscious discrimination of disabled workers while also transferring the 
government’s financial burden132 to private employers to accommodate 
them, but only as long as the employer makes a net profit off them.133 Also, 
128. Stanley A. Halpin, Looking over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil Rights and the 
Debate over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights Law on the Interpretation of the 
U.S. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (citing Sheryl Gay Stolberg & 
Adam Liptak, Courts In Transition: The Overview; Roberts Fields Questions on Privacy and Prece-
dents, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 2005, at A1 (Chief Justice Roberts’ comment on legislative history during 
his confirmation)).
129. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1769 (2010).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4)(6) (2012).
131. See Blair, supra note 1, at 530; Malloy, supra note 44, at 617-18; Ruan, supra note 5, at 29; 
see also Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1207-08.
132. Social-welfare programs and America’s generally untapped economic productivity of unem-
ployed or underemployed disabled workers. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2012).
133. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995); Malloy, supra
note 44, at 617-18; Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace 
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1272 n.199 (2003).
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since Congress enacted the ADA, studies have shown that companies bene-
fitted as both employers134 and as manufacturers.135 To be fair, ADA stand-
ards may seem to cost employers a lot of money on their face. However, 
studies have shown the average accommodation costing around $500, but 
those employers saw a return in the form of savings in the ballpark of 
$5,000 from accommodating.136 However, no substantive economic proof 
has been proffered for the idea that raising the Title VII reasonable ac-
commodation to the point of undue hardship at a “significant difficulty or 
expense” will take Muslims, Sikhs, Roman Catholics, or any other faiths 
off of welfare and cut down on the national debt.
Another economic argument a heightened Title VII standards propo-
nent could make is normative in that the accommodated employee will be 
happier and more productive. However, that argument carries equal weight 
regardless of whether the employer accommodates an employee’s religion 
or something else such as parental commitments. Additionally, one could 
argue some ADA accommodations involve time where the disabled worker 
might have to leave for doctor appointments. However, unlike asking for 
taking the Sabbath off, the disabled employee simply works with his em-
ployer to move appointments or other paid time off around each other’s 
schedules. Therefore, the lack of a substantive report displaying derived 
economic benefits from religious accommodations hampers the cause of 
heightened Title VII standards’ commentators. This is especially true since 
very few Title VII religion claims are based on invidious discrimination 
that could motivate Congress and the electorate to justify economic costs 
for the further promotion of religion. But even then, certain religious prac-
tices that would be asserted as accommodations are counter-productive to 
national policies such as those on drugs.137
B. Choice or No Choice, too Many Subjective Factors to Allow a Title VII 
Accommodation to Trump a Neutral Line
Most heightened Title VII standards commentators deal with the “mu-
tability” issue of religion in adamantly pushing for ADA-level standards.138
134. See Malloy, supra note 44, at 617-18.
135. See Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act Part II-Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 9, 18-19 (1998).
136. See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment 
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 377-78 (1997).
137. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding plaintiffs being discharged and subse-
quently denied unemployment benefits directly as a result of their religious practice of smoking tribal 
peyote did not violate their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
138. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 546-48.
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They put forth primarily that one’s religion is immutable, permanent, and 
unchangeable like skin color, race, and akin to the specific characteristics 
of the disabled as defined by the ADA.139 However most commentators 
cede that religion can be seen as a choice at the point someone devotes 
their life to it, yet as time goes on the religion becomes as much a part of 
someone as his skin color.140 Regardless of the commentators’ exercise in 
semantics and inquiry into the metaphysical aspects of religion, and wheth-
er there is a choice and if it truly becomes permanent, the answers and 
views commentators put forth are highly subjective, theoretical, and likely 
more informative in a non-legal setting. Simply put, the only important and 
relevant answer arising from the commentators’ analysis is that there is an 
element of choice for many in their religion. Whether that choice becomes 
permanent or not is an inquiry akin to the never-ending debate over wheth-
er there is a God. This article assumes most, if not all, people make a 
choice to follow a religion, and that at some point, that religious choice 
becomes permanent to a point where denial of their beliefs and practices 
would be akin to a denial based on any other immutable aspect.
Heightened Title VII standards’ commentators cite religious “choice” 
being protected when the Supreme Court ruled in Wisconsin v. Yoder that 
an Amish family could withhold their child from attending public school in 
contradiction of a compulsory-attendance state law due to their religious 
beliefs.141 However, they forget the ruling was based on a parent’s right to 
care for their child as he or she sees fit.142 More importantly, holding oth-
erwise would result in criminal sanctions being levied against any and all 
Amish religious followers with children, which would be a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.143
Allowing the parents in Yoder to exempt their child did not afford 
them any preference or special treatment. If the Court had held otherwise, 
the parents would have been forced to send their child to school, conform-
ing to society in complete contradiction of their religious tenets.144 If an 
employer in a customer-service-driven industry has a neutral rule of being 
clean-shaven that is uniformly applied, a Sikh is not forced to work there, 
since he is free to work wherever he wants. Whatever other issues com-
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
140. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 546-48; Schuchman, supra note 14, at 756-57.
141. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see Jamar, supra note 40, at 771-72.
142. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
143. See id. (“The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ practice of the Amish 
religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under 
threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious 
beliefs.”).
144. See id. at 216-18.
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mentators may raise with the Sikh hypothetical may be fair, but no one is 
forcing him to choose his job or his religion, if in fact at the outset he knew 
his religion forbade him to working under such terms. 145
An often-forgotten point of view in analyzing mutability and its effect 
on Title VII is that when someone chooses a religion, he knows what he is 
sacrificing. For example, between the ages of 14-16, every Amish child 
goes through a Rumspringa wherein he or she leaves home for a period of 
time to experience outside culture before deciding whether to devote his or 
her entire life to the Amish faith or to leave the community.146 Those who 
choose to be baptized into the Amish faith afterwards knows he or she will 
likely never live in a city, own a car, or be able to drink or smoke.147 Most 
children who are raised under a certain faith will at some point have to face 
a similar choice, and most know what he or she generally can and cannot 
do as a result. He or she makes his or her choice freely, uncompelled by 
any legally binding forces. However, if anyone is worth heightened legal 
protection of their faith, it is children going through this choice process 
since the family and community they grew up in are likely subscribers to 
that faith.148 Adults not raised under any certain faith who choose to be-
come a member of a faith are, for all intents and purposes, free of any legal 
forces and most normative defensible (family, community, etc.) sources of 
influence. When that adult, like the child, chose, he knew which limits 
were being placed upon what he could do with his life if he were to be a 
devout member. He likely has an even greater appreciation of the real 
world implications of that choice. Therefore, logically and ethically, a reli-
gious plaintiff claiming a known, strictly enforced, common neutral rule of 
general applicability, forcing him to choose between his faith and his job 
unless the claimed “neutral rule” is implemented after he started working 
there, seems indefensible. Even then, an employer can make certain ac-
commodations, which do not force a “yes” or “no” as to one’s job.149
145. A situation wherein the employer adopts a policy after the employee has already been work-
ing there is a different situation, and a “neutral rule” cannot be said to have been generally applied if in 
fact it was new. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D. Mass. 2006) (Rastafarian had 
been working in customer service for some time before clean-shaven policy was adopted). The case 
involved a franchisee adopting a clean-shaven policy for just his stores, but the franchisor (i.e., the main 
entity) did not mandate the policy. 
146. Lisa Biedrzycki, “Conformed to This World”: A Challenge to the Continued Justification of 
the Wisconsin v. Yoder Education Exception in A Changed Old Order Amish Society, 79 TEMP. L. REV.
249, 252-53 (2006).
147. Id.
148. See Blair, supra note 1, at 546-48.
149. See United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL 
3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010) (holding that Sikh and Muslim transit employees agree to wearing 
headwear which matches the transit employer’s uniform); Brown, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (D. Mass. 2006) 
(working in lower bay where no client contact is present).
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Another issue with regard to mutability and religion is the highly sub-
jective and individualized nature of each person’s personally held beliefs 
based on the institutional religious tenets.150 Professor Kaminer highlighted 
this subjectivity and where “choice” is the largest issue in three types of 
cases: “[(1)]where an employee does not follow a traditional institutional 
majority religion . . . [(2)] where an employee follows some but not all 
church dogma . . . [and (3)] where an employee becomes more observant 
over the course of [their] employment and requests additional accommoda-
tions.”151
As to minority faiths, Professor Kaminer is correct in stating that 
courts are skeptical of how bona fide the belief is, but incorrect as to her 
rationalizing the courts’ denial of accommodations on the basis “of person-
al choice.”152 Rather, a lack of communication by the employer, employee, 
or both, is more likely the source. For example, in Cloutier v. Costco 
Wholesale Corporation, the employee was a member of the Church of 
Body Modification and did not indicate her religious beliefs and practices 
until after numerous confrontations with management.153 The court held for 
Costco because the employee made an ultimatum in seeking her accommo-
dation as a complete exemption from the company’s neutral policy.154 Con-
trast Cloutier with New York City Transit Authority wherein the Sikh and 
Muslim employees made a good faith effort to find a compromise.155 Fur-
thermore, on the issue skepticism regarding minority religions, the courts 
compromised in handling Title VII religious accommodation cases by not
inquiring into the validity of a plaintiff’s alleged religious bona fide belief 
or practice in any significant way; instead courts focus on the reasonable-
ness of the accommodation.156
150. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title VII’s
Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 471 (2010).
151. Id. 
152. See id. at 472.
153. 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). The employee was asked to remove her facial jewelry in keep-
ing with the company policy numerous times, but it was not until later that she informed the employer 
of her religious reasons for doing so. Despite a compromise offered by the employer, that she wear clear 
retainers in the piercings while at work, the employee refused. Id. at 129-30.
154. Id. at 132-33; see Endres v. Ind. State Police, 349 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2003); Wilson v. 
U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1995). The court specifically held, “[w]e find disposi-
tive that the only accommodation Cloutier considers reasonable, a blanket exemption from the no-
facial-jewelry policy, would impose an undue hardship on Costco. In such a situation, an employer has 
no obligation to offer an accommodation before taking an adverse employment action.” Cloutier, 390 
F.3d at 132-33 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
155. United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL 3855191 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
156. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 129; Engle, supra note 21, at 362; Kaminer, supra note 150, at 472. 
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Professor Kaminer’s second category where the plaintiff only ascribes 
to some, but not all, of the church dogma is, according to her, likely the 
most widespread.157 However, Professor Kaminer’s characterization and 
understanding of this problem, as courts holding someone’s partial dogmat-
ic belief as not bona fide, is questionable. The issue is actually how each 
person “chooses” to practice his bona fide religious beliefs in his own way, 
such as a Roman Catholic pharmacist who decides he is going to effectuate 
the church’s abstinence stance by refusing to help, talk to, or even 
acknowledge anyone who looks like he or she would inquire about contra-
ceptives.158 Under current Title VII standards, employees are not free to 
practice their beliefs to such extremes and the heightened standards com-
mentators are likely not in favor of allowing this type of practice. However, 
upon crossing the line of neutral policy, lesser examples become question-
able in imposing an undue hardship, such as whether wearing an anti-
abortion button by any faith imposes an undue hardship within an office 
setting, a retail store, a drug store, a warehouse and so forth.159 Though 
work-scheduling and personal-appearance cases may be the primary cases 
alluded to by commentators, the pharmacist and button cases are signifi-
cantly more questionable as to reasonability. In the current workplace, 
where so many rights collide, do Americans want to have as politically 
divisive topic as religion to gain a potential trump card within the work-
place? This area of law is highly sensitive, and the courts have mostly 
agreed to skirt over the element of whether the plaintiff’s belief was bona 
fide and instead focus on the accommodation.160 The courts’ compromise 
has resulted in a policy of neutrality as to the accommodations that would 
be accorded where a strictly enforced generally applied neutral rule of ap-
plicability by an employer exists.161
Professor Kaminer’s view on her final category of “choice” issues, 
wherein the employee becomes more devout over time and requests further 
accommodations as time progresses, is the one area of “choice” that is 
agreeable.162 An employee who has made a choice to join a religion be-
157. Kaminer, supra note 22, at 476-77. She cites EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad 
de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2002), as a case displaying how 
courts are skeptical of someone’s beliefs when there is evidence of employee conduct contrary to the 
tenets of his faith. However, this case seems to turn on the contradictory behavior as providing a justifi-
able skepticism to how bona fide his anti-union membership belief in light of the fact he denied the 
union offered accommodation to the certain parts of union membership he initially sought. See id. at 56-
57.
158. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x. 581 (7th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
159. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
160. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 129; Engle, supra note 21, at 362.
161. Kaminer, supra note 150, at 472.
162. Id. at 477-79.
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comes more connected with the faith and community as time goes on.163 At 
the point where the religion conflicts with work in the slightest, the em-
ployer will have been put on notice and should be communicating with the 
employee about how his newfound faith will impact his work (e.g., holi-
days, daily practices, and potential work requirements). Therefore, an em-
ployee should bring up any potential conflicts, and, depending on the 
degree of conflict, the employer can make a good faith effort to accommo-
date those conflicts (i.e. use vacation day for a non-traditional holiday or 
voluntary shift swaps). In a majority of the cases Professor Kaminer alludes 
to, there was a lack of communication between parties.164 Employees who 
choose or change their religion as an adult should be aware of the ramifica-
tions of their choice, and thus, the employee’s knowledge of potential ap-
pearance or scheduling conflicts at the time of choosing a faith should be
crucial in the accommodation inquiry. If a reasonable employee knows 
becoming a Sikh would violate Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration rules at his current job,165 then he should know his religious choice 
likely means he needs to seek a transfer or new job wherein his beard will 
not cause compliance or safety issues.166
Finally, “choice” is not present in the ADA setting, since no sane in-
dividual would choose to become disabled. The court adjudicating an ADA 
accommodation case can look to objective measurements, such as how 
disabled the employee was (e.g., doctors evaluations), what kind of ac-
commodations are available,167 and whether the minimum requisite ac-
commodation would impose undue hardship.168 While some subjectivity is 
still involved, the sources, such as doctors, are held to objective standards 
such as being Board Certified. Title VII religious accommodation cases, in 
contrast, are more likely to encounter a plethora of subjective choices rang-
ing from why the employer implemented the conflicting policy to the em-
ployee’s specific religious practice. Most importantly though, the source of 
why there is a need for an accommodation is subject to significantly more 
judicial scrutiny under the ADA. A Title VII plaintiff’s choices in why he 
practices his specific belief, why a certain religion has certain practices 
163. See Blair, supra note 1, at 547-48.
164. Kaminer, supra note 150, at 477-79.
165. Due to him having to grow a beard of which an accommodation to bring the employer in 
compliance is either unavailable or significantly expensive.
166. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding Sikh employee’s
beard would compromise OSHA safety standards if allowed to maintain role as machinist surrounded 
by toxic gases).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012).
168. § 12111(10).
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based on its beliefs, or both, are not subject to significant judicial scruti-
ny.169
In closing, “choice” is a significant issue with respect to Title VII ac-
commodations. Consensus says at some point an individual confirms their 
religion and thus the reasonable knowledge of career limitations should be 
held against them since they freely chose the faith fully understanding 
those limitations. Minority religions are fairly dealt with, as courts require 
minimal evidence of a bona fide religious belief. Finally, every person’s 
right to mold and practice one’s beliefs as one sees best is laudable, but 
within the workplace, where many interests conflict, a neutral policy which 
is truly generally applied with strict enforcement should not be trumped by 
religion.
C. Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison Signaled the 1972 
Amendment’s Language was not Strong Enough
Commentators in favor of higher Title VII standards allude to the 
1972 congressional amendment to Title VII.170 Hardison held the amend-
ment, and EEOC guidelines based on the amendment, were of no help in 
defining the parameters of the employers’ duty.171 The legislative history of 
the amendment is scant,172 and the actual amendment says nothing about 
what exactly a “reasonable accommodation” or “undue hardship”173 is as of 
2012, 40 years since it was enacted and 35 years since Hardison was de-
cided. The commentators’ reliance is understandable, but unpersuasive 
because Congress never directly replied. With so little to go on, the Court 
was walking a “tightrope” in interpreting the 1972 amendment out of fear 
that Establishment Clause issues might arise if a worker’s accommodation 
would require the violation of a strictly enforced neutral rule of general 
applicability in the form of a collectively bargained seniority system.174 By 
holding neutrality principles applied to the accommodation, the Court was 
avoiding an Establishment Clause issue, preserving Congress’ legislation, 
169. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129 (1st Cir. 2004); Engle, supra note 
40, at 361-62.
170. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 523-24.
171. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73-79 (1977).
172. See 118 CONG. REC. 705-06 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
173. See, e.g., Schuchman, supra note 14, at 751-52.
174. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“By preserving doctrinal flexibility and 
recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses ‘we have been able 
to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any 
semblance of established religion. This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have successfully traversed.’”).
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and likely signaling to Congress that a higher standard required explicit 
language by them and not the EEOC.175
D. Congress Never Successfully Responded to Hardison, but has Elsewhere 
with Mixed Results
From 1996 to 2012, versions of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act 
(“WRFA”) were introduced thirteen times in Congress, but little result-
ed.176 WRFA adopts the undue hardship language of the ADA into Title 
VII, specifically rebukes Hardison, and makes many of the current ac-
commodations typically offered by employers unreasonable.177 Though
looking to legislative history is not always indicative on legislative intent, 
thirteen attempts from 1996 onward, in either the House of Representatives 
or Senate, indicates that the national electorate does not want heightened 
standards. However, a more viable theory is likely Establishment Clause 
concerns since the 1972 amendment has been referred to as the low-
hanging fruit of Title VII ripe for invalidation.178 Furthermore, in light of 
Congress’s response to Employment Division v. Smith,179 with the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act180 being essentially invalidated subsequent-
ly in City of Boerne v. Flores,181 the Court made it quite clear that further 
raising the standard may not only implicate Establishment Clause issues, 
but also potentially implicates state sovereign immunity issues via the lim-
its on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well with respect to Title 
VII as applied to public employers.182
E. “Moral Hazards” with Employees and an Unknowable Effect on Private 
and State Employers
The ADA affects roughly 43 million people,183 whereas Title VII with 
respect to religion has an unlimited scope to roughly all 300 million Amer-
175. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 73-79; see also McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 863 
(2005).
176. See, e.g., S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong. 
(2008); H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 893, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 
2572, 107th Cong. (2002). Many others exist.
177. S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012). 
178. See Oleske, supra note 93, at 537.
179. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding plaintiffs being discharged and subsequently denied unem-
ployment benefits directly as a result of their religious practice of smoking tribal peyote did not violate 
their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
180. Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-bb-4 (2012)).
181. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
182. See Oleske, supra note 93, at 536-37, 570-71.
183. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
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icans. Some commentators view the 300 million point as misleading be-
cause most Title VII claims come from minority religions, which is proba-
bly the truth under the current standard.184 Over the course of our nation’s 
history, it’s likely that the traditions of the majority religions (i.e. Judeo-
Christian faiths except Islam) became embedded in the American work-
place to the point where those traditions are assumed to be secular  and thus 
little, if any, rational accommodation the followers of those large religions 
would really push for.185 However, in order to raise the Title VII standards, 
Congress will have to raise it as applied to all faiths because the promotion 
of specific religions renders the legislation per se invalid under the Estab-
lishment Clause.186
The more “radical” elements of the majority faiths could seek accom-
modations under this new standard, and the potential for labor unrest seems 
high where, for example, a Roman Catholic worker seeks the accommoda-
tion of being allowed to wear an anti-abortion button to work.187 Admitted-
ly, the worker’s accommodation would likely impart undue hardship in a 
face-to-face customer-service context, but within a private office context, it 
would be a closer question. The employer will not be able to prove the 
accommodation places “significant difficulty” upon it since fellow co-
worker grumblings and uneasiness with a particular view are not enough to 
prove undue hardship under the current standards in certain circuits.188
Worst-case scenario for this situation would be if the employer had a strict-
ly enforced neutral policy of no buttons to be worn, which the Roman 
Catholic’s accommodation trumps, and an agnostic worker who wears a 
“pro-choice” button in response. The agnostic worker has no protection due 
to the employer’s no-button policy, thus showing freedom of religion 
trumps freedom of speech. Though knowing the extent to which majority 
faiths would have an effect on the workplace is theoretical, the outward 
appearance of preferential treatment for those faiths could be more overt 
with raised standards than they may currently be under the current stand-
ard.
In connection with the majority faith issue is that a “moral hazard” for 
employees arises with higher Title VII standards as people could potential-
ly pick and choose certain faiths with the knowledge that they can take 
certain days off, wear piercings to work with no worry of an employer’s 
184. See Blair, supra note 1, at 535-36.
185. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x. 581 (7th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
186. See McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005).
187. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
188. See, e.g., Crider v. Univ. of Tenn., Knoxville, No. 11–5511, 2012 WL 3002756, at *4 (6th 
Cir. July 23, 2012); Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1996).
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policy trumping, and as a pharmacist, ignore anyone who looks like they 
might inquire about contraceptives among other practices.189 If a 1,000-
member, online-only church can survive the bona fide belief inquiry, then 
anything an employee can practically imagine based off a religious belief is 
possible. Thus, would deeper inquiry by the courts into the bona fide belief 
be required to stem this “moral hazard?” This highly sensitive issue likely 
would create a split among the circuits and thus would probably reach the 
Supreme Court where they would have to answer with a standard, or at 
least Americans would hope the Court would. In all, a legal and political 
mess potentially could ensue if the Court gives no clear standard. As a final 
statement on this issue, one must remember under the ADA a plaintiff’s 
disability is subject to vast objective inquiry by the courts, whereas the 
inquiry under Title VII for religion is highly subjective and a mere formali-
ty.
F. Constitutional Issues
In order for Title VII accommodation standards to trump a strictly en-
forced or provable neutral rule of general applicability, it must not violate 
the Establishment Clause. It must also not go beyond the scope of Congres-
sional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to 
public employers. 
1. Establishment Clause
Heightened Title VII standards commentators accept that the Estab-
lishment Clause is the biggest hurdle the higher standard faces.190 In any 
challenge, the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman is applicable.191 The 
commentators put forth multiple specific arguments for why a heightened 
standard would not fail the test, but ultimately their argument can be gener-
alized as the “accommodation[s] allow [] the government to take steps to 
favor religion ‘by allowing it room to exist.’”192
Commentators base their argument erroneously on what they call the 
current “preferential treatment” religion gets in the form of its institutions 
receiving tax-exempt status, schools receiving funding from the state, and 
189. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004).
190. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 21, at 392-93; Jamar, supra note 40, at 770-72.
191. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (“Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from 
our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”); see Blair, supra note 1, at 550.
192. See Blair, supra note 1, at 552 (internal quotations omitted).
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exemptions from Title VII in certain regards.193 The tax-exempt status reli-
gious institutions receive has been held by the Court as not violative of the 
Establishment Clause because of historical precedent194 and because “the 
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply 
abstains from demanding that the church support the state.”195 More im-
portantly, the Court has found the tax-exempt status helps promote the 
Establishment Clause’s purpose of separation of church and state.196 As to 
state funding of religious schools, the commentators miss how the Court 
has found religious school funding constitutional only where the same 
funding or tax breaks to parents of religious school children have been 
extended to public schools and its parents.197 Finally, the Title VII exemp-
tions to religious institutions have been recently re-affirmed as non-
violative in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC because without these exemptions, particularly the ministerial ex-
ception, the government would become involved in “ecclesiastical deci-
sions”, and a significant concern could arise for more traditional religions 
being afforded more deference than minority religions.198
All three arguments by commentators for a higher standard are erro-
neous because in all three instances the Court has found the government,
both legislatively and judicially, is doing less to inhibit or promote religion 
than the alternative.199 Not granting religious institutions tax-exempt status 
would inhibit religion by treating it like a for-profit corporation, thus al-
most explicitly telling citizens to donate money to secular non-profits for 
tax deductions and potentially even stigmatizing religious donors as being 
no better than a stockholder. State funding to public and secular private 
schools, as well as tax breaks to those schools’ parents for education ex-
penses, similarly inhibits religion by denying the religious schools and 
parents of its students’ benefits simply because they teach religion in addi-
193. See id. at 552-53.
194. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (“Nothing in this national attitude to-
ward religious tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given the remot-
est sign of leading to an established church or religion and on the contrary it has operated affirmatively 
to help guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief. Thus, it is hardly useful to suggest 
that tax exemption is but the ‘foot in the door’ or the ‘nose of the camel in the tent’ leading to an estab-
lished church. If tax exemption can be seen as this first step toward ‘establishment’ of religion, as Mr. 
Justice Douglas fears, the second step has been long in coming. Any move that realistically ‘establishes’
a church or tends to do so can be dealt with ‘while this Court sits.’”).
195. Id. at 675.
196. See id. at 676-77.
197. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397-98 
(1983).
198. 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07 (2012).
199. See, e.g., id.
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tion to the state-mandated curriculum. Finally, subjecting religious institu-
tions’ hiring decisions, especially ones involving its ministers, to the same 
standards as secular employers inhibits religion by denying religious organ-
izations the right to employ those promoting its values and thus integrating 
the government into the church as opposed to keeping them both sepa-
rate.200
An argument one commentator mentions in regard to Employment Di-
vision v. Smith is that “[t]he Court clearly was uncomfortable with evaluat-
ing the religious practices of individuals,” which actually points to a 
potential issue courts would face with a heightened Title VII standard. 201
As previously mentioned, the courts have made a compromise in handling 
Title VII religious accommodation cases by not inquiring into the validity 
of a plaintiff’s alleged religious bona fide belief or practice in any signifi-
cant way, instead focusing on the reasonableness of the accommodation.202
Thus courts would have to inquire into the validity of each plaintiff’s al-
leged religious belief or practice, which is something commentators agree 
courts are uneasy with doing.203 The new accommodation standards alone 
raise serious Establishment Clause questions, but now so does the highly 
probable new judicial inquiry of religious beliefs or practices.204 The poten-
tial for inconsistent court rulings between majority and minority religion 
plaintiffs, on whether their alleged religious belief or practice is bona fide, 
raises Establishment Clause concerns, since the government could promote 
certain religions at the expense of others.205 Furthermore, the fact that the 
government, through the courts, is now integrating itself into each religion 
by inquiring into and deciding which beliefs or practices of a religion are 
bona fide raises significant Establishment Clause concerns.206 If the courts 
actually adopted a new practice of significantly inquiring into plaintiffs’ 
alleged beliefs, then the practice violates the Establishment Clause. Even if 
a secular purpose could be found, it would be far outweighed by the judi-
cial practice primarily advancing certain majority religions and inhibiting 
lesser-known religions in combination with a newly “excessive govern-
200. See, e.g., id.
201. Blair, supra note 1, at 551-52.
202. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 129-30 (1st Cir. 2004); Engle, supra 
note 21, at 362.
203. See, e.g., Engle, supra note 21, at 362.
204. See Cloutier, 390 F.3d at 129-30.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-
07 (2012).
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mental entanglement” with religion in deciding the validity of religious 
beliefs and practices.207
Regardless of whether the new practice comes to fruition, a legislative 
enactment or the Supreme Court could create the new standard. The Su-
preme Court is a highly unlikely source based on its consistent holdings on 
the Title VII accommodations standards208 and the federal courts’ general 
uneasiness in dealing with religion cases.209 Therefore, Congress would 
likely be the one, and the standard would likely look like the most recent 
WRFA.210
Though the previously mentioned commentators’ arguments are 
somewhat strong, the WRFA, which strengthens Title VII’s religious ac-
commodations by adopting the ADA language, would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.211 The purpose of the WRFA is not likely to be held as 
being non-secular since it articulates the importance of religion being 
helped by it.212 Though, the WRFA could be passed along with other secu-
lar amendments, like the original 1972 amendment, the Court is likely to 
still rule that the WRFA is non-secular because of the strong religious lan-
guage.213 Since the WRFA would allow plaintiffs to trump strictly enforced 
neutral rules of general applicability, the WRFA would thus raise extreme 
questions of whether it has the effect of the government promoting religion. 
Referring back to the example where the Roman Catholic employee wore a 
pro-life button at a secular accounting office with no customer interaction 
and a strictly and uniformly applied policy of no buttons of any kind, the 
court could hold allowing the Roman Catholic employee to wear the button 
is a reasonable accommodation that does not place significant difficulty 
upon the employer.214 Add in the agnostic pro-choice employee who feels 
she must reply by wearing a pro-choice button the next day. Since the em-
ployer strictly enforces the no button policy, the employer could reprimand, 
demote or terminate the agnostic worker. However, the employer legally 
can do nothing to the Roman Catholic employee wearing the pro-life button 
207. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 1, at 550-51.
208. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 
479 U.S. 60 (1986); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
209. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“By preserving doctrinal flexibility 
and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses ‘we have been 
able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any 
semblance of established religion. This is a ‘tight rope’ and one we have successfully traversed.’”).
210. S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012).
211. See Oleske, supra note 93, at 537.
212. See S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-303e (1985), invalidated by Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
213. See Thornton, 472 U.S. 703.
214. See Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’n, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995).
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because she is wearing it as a way of practicing her religious belief. In a 
sense, the court will have ruled freedom of religion trumps freedom of 
speech. WRFA would be subject to serious questions of causing the gov-
ernment to entangle itself with religion as the example above would give 
the Roman Catholic the governmental sword to cut through the employer’s 
no button policy in forcing the employer to make an exception.
2. Free Exercise Clause
With regard to the Free Exercise Clause, the commentators are mixed 
on whether the clause affords them an argument in favor of raising Title 
VII religious accommodation standards.215 Regardless, the Free Exercise 
rights of employees would only be raised in the event heightened standards 
of WRFA were enacted on its face.
The issue the commentators do not address is what kind of effect those 
rights would face if the courts decided to now inquire significantly into 
whether a plaintiff’s alleged religious belief or practice is bona fide. Seri-
ous questions of governmental interference would likely arise since every 
denial of a plaintiff’s religious belief or practice as being bona fide could 
restrict a person’s right to later assert that belief is worthy of constitutional 
protection outside of work.216 With regard to the previously-stated button 
example,217 if the court held the Roman Catholic employee’s pro-life but-
ton is not a bona fide religious practice, then questions could arise as to 
whether she and other Roman Catholics can defend wearing the button in 
the public square on Free Speech rights. Furthermore, unlike the ADA, 
which has (yet again!) very objective standards of measuring whether 
someone is disabled and to what extent, Title VII religious inquiries would 
be extremely subjective and thus potentially create unequal Free Exercise 
rights accorded to different religions.218
3. Scope of Congress’ Section 5 Power
Finally, in light of City of Boerne v. Flores a heightened Title VII reli-
gious accommodation standard would likely face significant questions of 
whether Congress exceeded the scope of its powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.219 Unless the state employer has a historic pattern 
215. See Blair, supra note 1, at 552-55. For example, one of the commentators thinks the Employ-
ment Division v. Smith case “has left the Free Exercise Clause virtually meaningless.” Id. at 556.
216. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706-07 
(2012). 
217. See supra Section III.E.
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2009).
219. See 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997).
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or practice of unlawfully discriminating in the application of its neutral 
laws of general applicability, a plaintiff arguing “congruence” between 
Title VII’s newly heightened standard means used by Congress and the end 
of ensuring religious employees practices are not restrained by strictly en-
forced neutral rules of general applicability would be highly questiona-
ble.220 If the Court rules the new standard exceeds the scope of Congres-
Congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then 
private employees would be afforded more protection than public employ-
ees.221
IV. COMMON SENSE RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS DOCTRINE THAT 
PROMOTES WORKPLACE PEACE AND PREVENTS EMPLOYER “MORAL 
HAZARDS”
Title VII should maintain its current “reasonable accommodation” and 
“undue hardship” standards that an accommodation can never trump a 
strictly enforced neutral rule or law of general applicability. However, cer-
tain employer-employee and Title VII religious accommodations litigation 
aspects need to be uniformly altered and applied across the circuits to make 
the outcomes in the employment or judicial context more cooperative, fair-
er, and more common-sense based. The “interactive process” within the 
ADA needs to be uniformly adopted by the circuit courts for Title VII reli-
gious accommodations to minimize the amount of litigation and promote 
communication between an employer and its employees.222 The conflict 
between the religious practice and the employer policy should not have to 
be eliminated by the accommodation, but rather the conflict should have to 
at least be resolved to the point where the “spirit” of the employer’s work 
policy and the employee’s religious belief or practice is respected.223 Final-
ly, where the religious employee worked for the employer before the con-
flicting policy was implemented, the employer will have to prove the 
policy was implemented for rational, non-arbitrary reasons.224
Reasonable accommodation and undue hardship standards should de-
pend upon the amount of negotiations in good faith by both parties akin to 
the ADA’s “interactive process.”225 The more the two sides discuss their 
220. See id. at 530.
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., Hoppe v. Lewis Univ., 692 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2012).
223. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL 
3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
224. See Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1996).
225. Compare Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009), 
with Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1996).
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concerns and reasons behind their policy and religious practices, the more 
likely they can find a compromise.226 The transit authority negotiated ex-
tensively with its Muslim and Sikh employees in order to seek a compro-
mise where its desire for uniformity and the spirit of the employees’ 
religious practice of wearing certain headwear could be respected. 227 Both 
sides agreed the employees’ religious headwear would match the color of 
the transit authority uniforms.228
The “interactive process” is partially seen in Title VII religious ac-
commodation cases since an employer has a duty to negotiate with the em-
ployee in good faith.229 However, the burden upon the employee is simply 
to “cooperate” with the employer after informing him of the need for an 
accommodation.230 Therefore, the religious employee’s duty is passive 
since he is not required to present any real “proof” of his religious belief or 
practice.231 The employer should not be under the burden to research each 
employee’s faith and guess for himself what type of an accommodation 
would resolve the conflict. Instead, like in the ADA cases, the employee 
should be required to bring forth the requisite information about his prac-
tice and belief, while the employer is burdened with determining a pro-
posed accommodation based on the employee’s information.232 The type of
information the employee should bring forth depends on the situation, but 
could range from anything as small as an online link to the church’s official 
site to something as formal as a letter from the “minister” of the employ-
ee’s faith. The employer’s request for any clarifying information would 
have to be reasonable233 and would only arise with respect to temporal 
accommodations as religious days of observance or timing of daily practic-
226. See N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 2010 WL 3855191, at *3.
227. See id.
228. See id. at *5. Note, however, that the case was in court because the negotiations reached an 
impasse on the final point of whether the employees had to place a transit authority patch on their 
religious headwear. Id. The conflicting transit authority uniform policy gave employees the option of 
wearing no headwear at all or a transit hat. In my opinion, whether “undue hardship” is placed on the 
transit authority by not having its logo on the religious employees uniform headwear is something 
reasonable minds can differ upon.
229. See, e.g., Opuku-Boateng, 95 F.3d at 1467.
230. See, e.g., Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987).
231. See id.
232. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 314 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the 
plaintiff presented multiple documents the defendant-employer could use to determine a proper ac-
commodation).
233. For accommodation, the requested clarifying information would have to be central to the 
spirit of the employee’s belief or practice just like under the ADA where the employer asks for more 
specifics about its employee’s disability and his doctor’s recommendations. See Rohr v. Salt River 
Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2009).
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es are more set in stone.234 In all, adopting the “interactive process” re-
quirement into Title VII would prevent situations leaving an employer 
guessing whether its employee’s hard line “complete exemption” from the 
policy stance will be held as a reasonable accommodation.235
The current Title VII requirement of the reasonable accommodation 
“eliminat[ing] the conflict between employment requirements and religious 
practices”236 should not be read to eliminate the conflict, but to ensure that 
the “spirit” of the employee’s religious practice and the employer’s policy 
remain intact.237 For example, in the New York Transit Authority case dis-
cussed above, the employer allowed religious headwear as long as it 
matched the uniform’s colors.238 This accommodation maintained the em-
ployer’s professional appearance and uniformity and allowed the religious 
employee to maintain the spirit of their religious practice. The employer 
may not obtain its logo on the employee’s headwear, but the uniformity 
sought by the employer is still intact.239 In situations where one might ar-
gue the only accommodation possible was a complete exemption from the 
employer policy, typically neither party was likely creative within the “in-
teractive process” as those all-or-nothing situations are illusory. However, 
where there truly is a complete conflict, the employee and employer need 
not worry since the employee will now have to prove he substantially com-
plied with the “interactive process” under the proposed modifications, and 
the employer still has the same good faith burden to prove undue hardship. 
In some instances, the religious employee will be denied protection, but 
under my proposal, denial would happen less often due to the “interactive 
process” and even if the Title VII standards were set on par with the ADA, 
there would still be some religious employees denied.240
Another reason why religious employees’ accommodations will be 
denied less often is because my proposal places a heavier burden upon 
employers who implement the conflicting facially neutral policy of general 
applicability after the religious employee had already been working there. 
234. See Loftus v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 08–13397, 2010 WL 1139338 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 24, 2010) (ruling employee’s “desire to travel to the Holy Land for six months was based on 
his personal preference rather than a religious obligation”).
235. See Noesen v. Med. Staffing Network, Inc., 232 F. App’x. 581 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that an 
employer made multiple attempts to accommodate pharmacist who refused to acknowledge anyone who 
he thought might inquire about contraceptives).
236. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 (1986).
237. See United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04–CV–4237(SLT)(MDG), 2010 WL 
3855191 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010).
238. Id. at *5.
239. See id.
240. See Noesen, 232 F. App’x. 581.
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In order for an employer to show any accommodation would cause it undue 
hardship, the employer needs to additionally prove the new neutral policy 
or rule of general applicability was implemented for “proven rational, non-
arbitrary reasons.”241 The Brown case best represents this situation since 
the Rastafarian employee’s role involved substantial customer service be-
fore the employer implemented a no beard policy, based on a consultant’s 
recommendation, and subsequently assigned the employee to the lower 
bay.242 Under my “proven rational, non-arbitrary reasons” solution, the 
employer needs to show the policy was implemented based on sound busi-
ness principles,243 has been strictly enforced since being implemented, and 
the policy has caused the desired effect by show of some noticeable tangi-
ble evidence. This strong burden is placed upon the employer here because 
the policy it is implementing may be “neutral,” but the policy has yet to be 
proven as strictly enforced. More importantly the burden is meant to pre-
vent the “moral hazard” an employer has to implement any facially neutral 
policy it wants with the superficial rationale akin to “public image” or “uni-
formity”; neither of which requires any real evidence to be proven by the 
employer and yet is almost impossible to disprove because those rationales 
are mostly intangible and highly subjective in effect.244 Additionally, the 
higher burden may help smoke out any invidious intent.
CONCLUSION
With so many rights in play within the workplace, religion is some-
thing that should be merely tolerated, not promoted or denounced. The 
ADA is afforded a stronger accommodation standard due to societal and 
economic concerns as well as because of the immutability of disability. A 
more preferential Title VII standard could be struck down in violation of 
the Establishment Clause due to the potential governmental entanglement 
with religion either by affording religion a sword to cut through employers’ 
strictly enforced or provable neutral rules or laws of general applicability, 
or by a newly strengthened judicial inquiry into deciding what aspects of 
religion are bona fide. The commentators in favor of heightened standards, 
while sound in some of their arguments, ultimately fail to see that at some 
point an employee’s religion was a choice, and as such, should deal with 
241. See Piraino v. Int’l Orientation Res., Inc., 84 F.3d 270, 274-76 (7th Cir. 1996).
242. Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16 (D. Mass. 2006).
243. The exact extent of what this would mean in terms of evidentiary proof or burden of proof is 
beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say the consultant report in the case would be sufficient 
in my opinion. See id.
244. See, e.g., Wolkinson, supra note 22, at 1185-86.
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the consequences of their actions. Title VII’s issues may be fixed with 
some common sense modifications, but increasing the reasonable accom-
modation standard will only lead to chaos and “moral hazards” for employ-
ees.
